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There has been a recent surge of interest in using taxes to curb poor food consumption behaviour
by individuals. In 2009-2010 at least 17 US States proposed additional taxes on sugary drinks,
and in January 2010 Denmark introduced a 25% tax increase on ice cream, chocolate and candy,
as well as a tax on soft drinks (Danish Ministry of Taxation, 2009). Recently the OECD has
called for the implementation of a package of measures, which include taxing unhealthy foods,
in low and middle income countries to help ￿ght growing obesity (Cecchini et al, 2010). These
proposals are in response to concerns about the growth in diet related chronic diseases, although
they would also bring in welcome additional tax revenue.
Saturated fat is a major contributor to the increase in diet-related health problems, as
it raises blood cholesterol and high blood cholesterol is a leading contributor to the onset of
cardiovascular disease. In the UK the average person consumes 20% more saturated fat than is
recommended (FSA, 2009) and in 2006 the treatment of cardiovascular disease cost the national
health service £14.4 billion (British Heart Foundation, 2009). In the US, the government states
that "most Americans need to decrease their dietary intakes of saturated fat" to decrease their
risk of elevated levels of blood cholesterol (US Department of Health and Human Services et
al, 2005).
The impact of these taxes on consumer behaviour and tax revenue will depend not only on
how consumer demand responds to price changes but also on how ￿rms respond in terms of
the prices they set. In perfectly competitive markets these e⁄ects are relatively straightforward
to estimate. However, the markets in which most food products are sold are better typi￿ed
by di⁄erentiated product oligopoly. When ￿rms have market power these taxes may be over
or undershifted (Seade (1987), Anderson et al (2001)). Existing studies of fat and sugar taxes
have failed to account for this. In oligopoly settings the impact of a tax depends on a number
of factors including the form of tax, the curvature of demand, and the details of ￿rm behaviour.
In particular, when multi-product ￿rms are the norm, as is the case in retail food markets,
product portfolios also matter. A ￿rm￿ s ability to pass a tax increase through to consumer
prices depends on the positioning of its portfolio of products in the product space.
In this paper we consider the potential to use taxes to curb consumption of saturated fat
in this context. We compare the performance of an excise and an ad valorem tax applied to
the market for butter and margarine. We estimate a structural model that allows for product
di⁄erentiation, rich consumer heterogeneity, substitution to the outside option and quantity
choice. We use the model to compute the impacts of the respective taxes, allowing for strategic
pricing behaviour by multi-product ￿rms. We use microdata on individual purchase transactions
with detailed information on an extensive list of product and household characteristics. We
1￿nd that accounting for ￿rms￿strategic behaviour is critically important for evaluating taxes in
this setting. In our speci￿c empirical application, the excise tax is slightly more e¢ cient than
an ad valorem tax in terms of the cost per unit reduction in saturated fat purchased. In part,
this is driven by the fact that an excise tax is a function only of products￿saturated fat content
(and not price). Conversely, the ad valorem tax succeeds in raising more revenue (reminiscent
of Suites and Musgrave (1953) who show that in monopoly, an ad valorem tax is more e¢ cient
at raising revenue).
The application we consider is to the UK market for butter and margarine. The pre-
cise quantitative results depend on the particulars of this market. However, the results have
broader qualitative implications. Almost all retail markets are di⁄erentiated product markets,
with many dominated by large multi-product ￿rms. Our results demonstrate the empirical
importance of accounting for this (when evaluating the impact of proposed tax policy reforms)
by estimating a structural demand system that allows di⁄erentiated products, ￿ exible demand
patterns and that accounts for asymmetries in ￿rm sizes and product portfolios.
Our work relates to several strands in the literature. The most directly related in terms of
the policies considered is the empirical literature that considers the impact of taxes on fat, and
includes Chouinard et al (2007), Smed et al (2007), Leicester and Windmeijer (2004), Marshall
(2000) and Acs and Lyles (2007).1 These authors have used continuous choice demand models,
have aggregated food products into commodity groups and assumed 100% pass-through. In
these papers, consumers respond to the tax by substituting between food categories. Substi-
tution within a category is ruled out. In contrast, we use a discrete choice demand model
and data that is disaggregated at both the household and product level, and compute ￿rms￿
pro￿t-maximising response to the tax. We allow households to substitute both within a food
category as well as to the outside option. In our model, products within a food category (e.g.
di⁄erent butter products) are seen by consumers as highly substitutable. We show that within
category substitution is empirically important, as butter and margarine products are highly
di⁄erentiated in terms of their intensity of saturated fat; the saturated fat content of butter
varies from 23.7g to 57g per 100g and for margarine from 0g to 26.6g.
Also closely related is the empirical literature that considers evidence on pass-through from
reduced-form studies. Besley and Rosen (1999) exploit variation in State and local sales taxes
in the US and look at the impact on prices of a number of products. They ￿nd a wide variety
of e⁄ects, including evidence of overshifting for a number of goods. Delipalla and O￿ Donnell
(1998) analyse the incidence of cigarette taxes in several European countries. Using cross border
variation in the composition of the overall tax burden between excise and ad valorem taxes,
1Papers that consider sin taxes on other goods include Adda and Cornaglia (2010), Bulow and Klemperer
(1998), Goolsbee et al (2010) and Hines (2007).
2they ￿nd that excise taxes have a larger impact than ad valorem taxes on consumer prices and
that, unlike ad valorem taxes, excise taxes are overshifted in several countries. Kenkel (2005)
uses data on how the price of alcoholic beverages changed in Alaska in response to increases
in the tax levied on alcohol and ￿nds pass through tends to be greater than 100%. Relative
to this literature we estimate a structural model which allows us to conduct ex ante analysis
of the impact of tax. Our results broadly accord with the reduced form literature - we ￿nd
pass-through of an excise tax is higher than an ad valorem tax and greater than 100%.
A number of papers in the theoretical literature consider taxes in oligopoly markets with
a homogenous good.2 Seade (1987) shows that in a homogenous good Cournot market, if the
elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve is su¢ ciently large, ￿rms will react to an
excise tax by increasing producer prices. He also shows that if the elasticity is large enough,
￿rms￿pro￿ts may increase in response to the tax. Delipalla and Keen (1992) show that in a
homogenous good Cournot model, overshifting is more likely for an excise tax than for an ad
valorem tax. Unlike an excise tax, an ad valorem tax reduces ￿rms￿marginal revenues, inducing
them to expand output. Anderson, de Palma and Kreider (2001) show that these results extend
to a model of symmetric di⁄erentiated demand and Bertrand competition. However, the results
are ambiguous if ￿rms are not symmetric. Further, while their results provide a great deal of
intuition about the forces governing the impacts of di⁄erent types of taxes, it is not clear
precisely how their results extend to empirically relevant cases in which ￿rms are asymmetric
not only in costs but also in the mean levels of utility that their products provide, and in
which there are multi-product ￿rms. Hamilton (2009) shows that the superior performance
of the ad valorem tax does not hold in a model with multi-product ￿rms and non-symmetric
di⁄erentiation, but again, it is not clear how these results extend to more complicated market
settings. Our results provide the ￿rst empirical look at how these forces play out in an actual
market setting with di⁄erentiated products, consumer heterogeneity and asymmetric multi-
product ￿rms.
Our analysis follows the empirical industrial organisation literature, particularly Berry,
Levinsohn, Pakes (1995, 2004) and Nevo (2001). Like these studies, we estimate a ￿ exible
discrete choice demand model and combine our demand estimates with a model of the supply
side of the market. This enables us to estimate products￿marginal costs, thereby allowing us
to simulate the impact of a tax on market equilibrium. Our work is also related to a number of
papers in the industrial organisation literature which seek to estimate the extent to which cost
2See, inter alia, Seade (1987), Stern (1987), Besley (1989), Delipalla and Keen (1992), Skeath and Trandel
(1994) and Hamilton (2008). Most assume Cournot competition. Exceptions include Kay and Keen (1983),
which considers monopolistic competition, Delipalla and Keen (1992), which considers a model of conjectural
variations and Stern (1987) which considers a range of models including Cournot oligopoly and monopolistic
competition. See also Bulow and Klemperer (1998).
3shocks are passed through to prices in the food industry, including Kim and Cotterill (2008),
Nakamura (2008) and Nakamura and Zerom (2008).
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines a model of
consumer and ￿rm behaviour. Section 3 presents the data and econometric results. Section 4
discusses the impact of introducing di⁄erent forms of tax on saturated fat and a ￿nal section
concludes.
2 Model
We ￿rst describe household behaviour and then ￿rm behaviour.
2.1 Household behaviour
We assume that the bene￿t that a household obtains from purchasing butter and margarine is
weakly separable from the bene￿t from other goods. Each household i 2 (1;:::;I) chooses to
purchase one product, de￿ned by brand j 2 (0;1;:::;J) and pack size s 2 (1;:::;Sj). The set of
products includes the outside good (j = 0;s = 1). There are J distinct butter and margarine
brands (j > 0), each of which is available in Sj di⁄erent pack sizes. We refer to a product as
a particular (j;s) pair. Households live and shop in di⁄erent markets, indexed m = 1;:::;M,
de￿ned by month-region pairs.3
We specify a random coe¢ cients discrete choice demand system.4 Preferences vary with both
observable and unobservable demographic characteristics, which allows for ￿ exible substitution
patterns. The payo⁄ to a consumer from a product depends on the product￿ s characteristics
and its price. Each household chooses the product that provides them with the highest payo⁄.
For the outside good, we assume household utility is









i for r = 1;:::;R; is a vector of observable household characterstics. We interact the
payo⁄ provided by selecting the outside option with observable household characteristics to
allow for heterogeneity in choices to buy or not. The parameter ￿0 captures the baseline payo⁄
from the outside option and for each r; ￿
r
1 captures the variation in payo⁄s across households
due to zr
i: Including the outside option allows households to respond to a tax by purchasing
butter and margarine less frequently or not at all.
3In our empirical application, price and region dummies are the only product characteristic that varies across
markets.
4See for example, Boyd and Mellman (1980), Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1995, 2004), McFadden and Train
(2000), Train (2003) and Nevo (2000, 2001).
4For all inside goods (j > 0), we assume that the payo⁄ uijsm for household i from product
























jsm are k = 1;:::;K observable product and market characteristics, ￿j are unobservable
brand characteristics, and "ijsm is an unobservable stochastic term.
We allow households to have heterogeneous preferences over the observed product character-
istics xk
jsm through the coe¢ cients ￿
k
i: These coe¢ cients vary both with observable household
characteristics zr
i, indexed r = 1;:::;R and unobservable household characteristics ￿k
i. We as-
sume ￿i ￿ N (0;￿), "ijsm are i.i.d. Type 1 extreme value random variables, and that ￿ are
drawn from an unknown distribution.





1 that capture variation in marginal payo⁄s across households due to observable
demographics. In our application, some product characteristics do not vary within brand. As
a result, some parameters in (1) and (2) are not identi￿ed. To make clear what parameters are
identi￿ed in our setting, we partition the (K ￿1) vector of product characteristics into the set
K1 that vary within brand, and the set K2 that are constant within brand. We substitute (2)
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and ￿ are parameters to be estimated. Note that to identify
the price elasticity of demand we do not need to separately identify ￿ and ￿
k
0 for k 2 K2: Price
is one of the product characteristics in the set K1: We assume all other product characteristics
do not change after we introduce the tax.
52.2 Identi￿cation
The UK retail food market is characterised by close to national pricing, with some, but only
little, cross-sectional variation in the price of each product. However, there is variation across
time and within brand across di⁄erent pack sizes. We identify the coe¢ cients on price primarily
through these two sources of variation: (1) variation in product price over time, and (2) variation
in unit price across pack sizes within brand, although we also allow for variation in prices (and
costs) across broad regions.
A standard concern in the industrial organization literature is that unobservable product
characteristics lead to correlation between the error term and price resulting in inconsistent
estimates of the price coe¢ cients. We believe that this is not a concern in our application for
several reasons. Our data allow us to control for very detailed product characteristics minimis-
ing the risk of correlation between the errors and price driven by the presence of unobservable
product characteristics. A regression of prices on the product characteristics in our data pro-
duces an R2 of 0.94. In particular, we include a large number (101) of brand-level ￿xed e⁄ects
and pack size dummies meaning that we control for unobservable product characteristics that
do not vary within brand and unobservable product characteristics that do not vary within
pack size. In addition, product characteristics in this market do not change rapidly if at all.
These factors justify the belief that this source of endogeneity is unlikely to be important in
our application.
A second potential source of endogeneity in prices arises if ￿rms change prices and simul-
taneously engage in unobserved promotional activity that stimulates demand. A particular
concern raised by Hendel and Nevo (2006) is that sales promotions may lead consumers to
substitute intertemporally which, if not modelled, can substantially bias demand estimates.
However, butter and margarine are perishable and so not easy to store for long. In our data,
households rarely purchase more than one pack of butter and margarine at a time. Therefore
we do not believe that stocking up is a major issue in this market.
Another common concern in the literature is that prices may be measured with error due
to imputation of missing prices. We do not have the same problem with missing prices that
is highlighted by, for example, Erdum, Keane and Sun (1998). Most supermarkets in the
UK operate national pricing policies, following a recommendation by the UK Competition
Commission (2000). This means that if we see a product purchased at any branch of the
supermarket we know that this is the price that will be charged at other branches. In practice
this means that we have very few missing prices.
62.3 Firm behaviour
As is common in the empirical industrial organisation literature, we assume that producers set
prices and compete in a Bertrand-Nash game, holding the menu of products on o⁄er constant.
See Nevo (2001) for example. Let Sjsm (pm) be the market share of product (j;s) in market
m when the vector of prices in the market is pm: Let Ff be the set of products sold by ￿rm




(pjsm ￿ cjsm)NmSjsm (pm) ￿ Kjsm: (5)
where cjsm is the marginal cost of product (j;s) in market m, Kjsm is the ￿xed cost of selling
the product in market m and Nm is the size of the market. Note that we hold Nm ￿xed when we
compute new equilibria. Since our model includes the outside option not to buy butter and we
observe people who choose not to buy, Nm remains constant when we simulate the introduction
of a tax. We interpret Nm as a measure of the population which is invariant to changes in tax
policy.








for all (j;s) 2 Ff: Since most ￿rms are multi-product ￿rms, there is a vector of equations for
most ￿rms.
We use the ￿rst-order conditions to estimate ￿rms￿marginal costs and to compute coun-






for all (j;s) 2 Ff and
(k;t) 2 Ff and for all f; we can recover marginal costs. For each f; we recover the marginal cost
of each product in each market, cjsm by inverting the system of equations (6). After computing
cjsm for all (j;s) and m, we simulate counterfactual equilibria that result from the imposition
of various taxes.
Equilibria are computed as follows. Let pfm be the vector of prices for products produced
by ￿rm f in market m and let p￿fm be the vector of prices of all other ￿rms in the market. A
Nash equilibrium in this market is a vector of prices pm = (p1m;:::;pFm) such that, for each f;
given p￿fm; pfm satis￿es (6): For each tax, we compute an equilibrium using a Gauss-Newton
based non-linear equation solver to ￿nd a price vector pm that satis￿es (6) for all f:
3 Data and econometric results
We use data from the Kantar (formerly TNS) World Panel for calendar year 2006 on all pur-
chases of food brought into the home by 16,637 households. Households record purchases of all
7items bought using handheld scanners and record prices from till receipts. The data contain a
large set of product attributes (at the barcode level) as well as household characteristics.5
We focus on the category butter and margarine because it is the single food category that
accounts for the highest proportion of saturated fat purchases made by UK households, ac-
counting for 13.3% of total annual saturated fat purchases.6 For each household we choose a
random shopping trip during calendar year 2006.7 That is, we assume that decisions to pur-
chase butter and margarine do not a⁄ect the probability of shopping and they are independent
across trips. We de￿ne a ￿ shopping trip￿as all goods purchased by a household on a single
day.8 We exclude shopping trips in which less than ￿ve purchases were made and consider
only products that we observe being purchased at least ￿ve times in each month.9 After taking
a random sample of shopping trips, we observe 4,488 purchases of butter or margarine, with
12,149 households choosing the outside option not to purchase any butter or margarine on that
trip. Of the purchases, 1,721 are of 50 di⁄erent butter products and 2,767 are of 92 di⁄erent
margarine products.
3.1 Product and household characteristics
Our data contain information on product characteristics including price, the nutritional content
of each individual product (from the information label on the package), brand, whether the
product is from an own-brand budget (generic) range, pack size and, if the product is margarine,
its type (whether it is healthy label, standard or margarine made with polyunsaturated fatty
acids (pufa)). The top panel of Table 1 lists the mean and standard deviation of the product
characteristics across our sample of observed purchases. Brand level ￿xed e⁄ects are not shown
- there are 101 brands encompassing 142 di⁄erent products (details are provided in the Web
Appendix). We control for product pack size, meaning that our model identi￿es the coe¢ cient
on price by exploiting variation in prices across markets and within brand variation in unit
price across products with di⁄erent pack sizes. For products that were not purchased we use
the average price of each product in each market. A market is de￿ned as a region-month. We
include three regions - the South-East, South-West and North of Great Britain, meaning there
are 36 markets and therefore 36 di⁄erent prices for each product.
5See Leicester and Old￿eld (2009) for further information on the data, and Gri¢ th and O￿ Connell (2009)
for further discussion of the nutrition component of the data.
6Together dairy products (cheese, butter, margarine, milk, ice cream and cream) contribute 35.1% to the
average households purchases of saturated fats. Snacks and meat are also signi￿cant contributors.
7Using more than one trip per household is not feasible given current constraints on computer memory and
processing power.
8We exclude a small number of households which only purchase very infrequently (fewer than 125 items
purchases over the year), and purchases where recorded values are extremely large or small.
9We exclude 146 products, each of which have a market share of less than 0.9% and which together account
for 6% of butter and margarine purchases in 2006.
8The household characteristics that we use include income (banded into ￿ve categories),
social class, household size, household structure, whether the main shopper is overweight or
obese and region. The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviations for
household characteristics across the households in our sample.
Given our estimates of individual demand, we must aggregate from our sample to the market
level to compute market equilibria. To do this we weight the data in two ways. First, because
we take one random shopping trip per household we weight each household by its shopping
frequency. Under the assumption that purchase decisions are independent across trips, this
provides an estimate of the expected number of purchases per year. Second, we use sample
weights provided by Kantar to weight up the sample to the level of the UK population. These
weights correct for over- or under-sampling of some household types.10
3.2 Market structure and ￿rms
The manufacturer of each product is identi￿ed in our data. This is essential in order to model
￿rm pricing responses. The 142 butter and margarine products are produced by 18 ￿rms. Table
2 lists the manufacturers (ordered by market share), the number of products they sell, their
market share, and lists each ￿rms￿highest selling product.
There are three types of ￿rm. The three largest ￿rms - Unilever, Dairy Crest and Arla - each
produce over 15 products and together they account for over half the market. Unilever and Arla
specialise in a certain type of product; their products tend to be clustered in one part of the
characteristics space. Unilever produces 19 relatively low fat, expensive margarine products.
Arla produces a range of butter products. Dairy Crest is slightly di⁄erent, it produces a group
of butter products clustered together in characteristics space and a group of margarine products
clustered in another part of the characteristics space. The second category comprises the big
four supermarkets. They all produce several own-brand products that span the characteristics
space. Tesco, for instance, produces everything from a small pack of expensive French butter
to a very large, very low priced pack of margarine. The ￿nal category consists of a number of
￿rms with relatively small market shares who each produce at most six products.
3.3 Estimation results
We estimate the model by maximum likelihood.11 The model contains 208 parameters. There
are too many to discuss in detail here in the main text. Instead, we provide a brief summary.
10Sampling weights are not used in estimation because sample selection is based on exogenous demographics,
not on the endogenous choice of butter purchases.
11To evaluate the likelihood and its gradient, we use Gauss-Hermite quadrature to approximate the multi-
dimensional integral for the mixed logit model.
9The full set of parameter estimates are shown in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Web Appendix. The
baseline price coe¢ cient is negative, and large in absolute terms. Most households reduce their
demand in response to an increase in price. We allow for preferences to vary with observable
household characteristics by interacting them with product characteristics. We also allow for
random preference variation for price and saturated fat content through the inclusion of random
coe¢ cients. We ￿nd that there is substantial heterogeneity both in terms of observed household
characteristics and unobserved characteristics. Next we discuss the elasticities implied by our
parameter estimates.
3.3.1 Elasticities
We calculate household level own- and cross-price elasticities for each product. We then com-
pute market-level elasticities for each product by aggregating across households weighting by
the predicted household-level ￿ market shares￿ , the frequency that each household shops and
household sampling weights (which gross up to the UK population). The formulae for the
aggregate elasticities are standard and are detailed in the Web Appendix.
The estimated market own-price elasticities are all negative and greater than one in absolute
magnitude. The average own-price elasticity is -2.44. The market cross-price elasticities (apart
from a small number of exceptions) are positive, suggesting that consumers view the products in
the market as substitutes. The model produces a 142x142 matrix of elasticities for all products.
Rather than reproduce the entire matrix, in Table 3, we show elasticities for two subsets of
products.
We show the own- and cross-price elasticities corresponding to six butter products produced
by the leading butter producer in the market (Arla whose leading brand is Lurpak) and ￿ve
margarine products produced by one of the supermarkets (Asda). Each entry in the table shows
the elasticity of demand for a product in column 1 with respect to the price of a product in
row 1. The upper-left section of the table displays the Lurpak butter products￿elasticities and
the bottom right-hand sections displays the Asda margarine products￿elasticities. A standard
multinomial logit model with no heterogeneity in household preferences would yield cross-price
elasticities that are constant within each column. In our results, that is not the case. The
heterogeneity in preference (along observable and unobservable dimensions) ensures our model
can generate ￿ exible substitution patterns.
Comparing the cross-price elasticities within each column shows that the Lurpak products
are closer substitutes to Lurpak products than to Asda margarine products and vice versa. A
change in the price of a Lurpak product has a larger impact on other Lurpak products than on
Asda margarine products. Similarly, a change in one of the Asda product￿ s prices has a larger
impact on the other Asda products than on the Lurpak products. These patterns accord with
10prior beliefs and would be ruled out ex ante in a model with no preference heterogeneity.
3.3.2 Marginal costs
We recover the marginal cost for each product in each market by inverting the ￿rst order
conditions (6) for each ￿rm. The weighted average estimated marginal cost is 56p, which
compares to the average price in the market of £1.01 (Table 1). The average price-cost margin
is 0.45.
There is considerable heterogeneity across products. Moreover, products have similar markups
despite quite di⁄erent market shares. This would be ruled out in a standard multinomial logit
model with single product ￿rms. For example, consider the four margarine products with
the largest market share, shown in Table 4. Flora Light Low Fat Spread 500g (produced by
Unilever) is a very similar product to Clover Dairy Spread 500g (produced by Diary Crest).
However, the Unilever product has lower marginal cost and higher margin, re￿ ecting Unilever￿ s
larger scale production and the market power they derive from their portfolio of products. A
similar comparison holds for I Can￿ t Believe It￿ s Not Butter (I.C.B.I.N.B) Dairy Spread 500g
and St Ivel Utterly Butterly Dairy Spread 500g.
The table also includes the standard deviation of each product￿ s marginal cost across the 36
markets. There is some variation in marginal costs across markets. This contributes to across
market price variation. Nonetheless, the variation in marginal costs for each product across
markets is much less than the variation across products.
Table 5 shows mean marginal costs and margins across markets for three groups of products.
The ￿rst panel includes four own-brand budget butter products with 250g pack sizes; in the
second panel we show ￿ve 500g margarine products, which all advertise themselves as tasting
like butter; in the third we show four 250g butter products that are made by one ￿rm.
The products chosen in the ￿rst two panels are very close in characteristics space to one
another and therefore are likely to be close competitors. The products have similar marginal
costs, as one would expect for similar products. The ￿nal panel of the table illustrates how
marginal cost and margins vary within ￿rm for 250g butter products as ￿ quality￿changes.
For this particular ￿rm higher quality products tend to have higher marginal costs, but lower
margins.
Table 6 lists the 18 ￿rms that together produce the 142 products in the market. It shows
the average marginal cost, price and margin of their products and their total annual variable
pro￿ts. The three market leading ￿rms all have mean marginal costs at least as large as the
market average. This is driven by the fact that their products are relatively high end, re￿ ected
in the fact that the mean price of their products is at least as large as the market average.
Comparison of products produced by these three ￿rms and comparable products produced by
11other ￿rms highlights that, conditional on price, the three dominant ￿rms actually tend to have
lower marginal costs. For instance, in panel 2 of Table 5 the Unilever product has a very similar
price to its competitors and a marginal cost which is between 3 and 6 pence lower. Notice also
the average ￿rm margins vary from 0.37 for Yeo Valley - which produces a premium butter -
to 0.67 for Netto - which produces very inexpensive margarine products.
4 Impact of introducing a tax
We use our structural estimates to compute new equilibria after the introduction of tax on
saturated fat. Equilibria are computed as discussed in Section 2.3. We consider both an excise
tax and an ad valorem tax. In each case, households respond by substituting between brand,
between pack sizes and to the outside option (i.e. purchasing less frequently). Firms respond
by adjusting prices.
The impacts of introducing an excise and an ad valorem tax are quite di⁄erent. The excise
tax tends to be overshifted to consumer prices while the ad valorem tax tends to be undershifted.
This has di⁄ering implications for equilibrium market shares and pro￿ts. It also in￿ uences the
e⁄ectiveness of the tax in achieving a reduction in the amount of saturated fat households
purchase.
In this section we highlight three important results. First, we show that taking account
of how ￿rms respond is important. Neglecting to do so (as has been the norm in the existing
literature) leads to large errors when evaluating the impact of introducing a tax. Moreover, the
sign of the error for one form of tax is the opposite of the sign for the other form.
Second, we highlight how multi-product ￿rms can partially shield themselves from the im-
pact of the tax. Some ￿rms are better able to do this because of the portfolio of products they
sell. In addition, the extent to which they can do this varies with the form of tax.
Third, we analyse the overall costs and bene￿ts of each tax and look at how these vary
across individuals. Comparing an excise tax with an equivalent ad valorem tax (meaning they
raise the same revenue in the absence of ￿rm response), we show that the excise tax has a
much larger e⁄ect on purchasing. because ￿rms pass-through more than 100% of the tax. In
contrast, the ad valorem tax is passed-through by less than 100%. As a result, the excise
tax leads to a greater reduction in saturated fat purchased. Using cost per 1kg reduction in
saturated fat as a measure of cost e⁄ectiveness, this implies that the excise tax is more e¢ cient
at reducing saturated fat. Firm pro￿ts are reduced by more with the ad valorem tax than the
excise tax while compensating variation suggests that consumer losses (abstracting from any
health bene￿ts) are larger with the excise tax than the ad valorem. Tax revenues are higher
with the ad valorem tax.
124.1 Form of tax
We consider an excise tax that is proportional to saturated fat content. As a result, with a tax
rate of ￿e; the post-tax marginal cost of product (j;s) is
c
￿
jsm = cjsm + ￿esatjs (7)
where satjs is the saturated fat content of product (j;s) and cjsm is the product￿ s pre-tax
marginal cost in market m. We consider a tax rate of 10p per 100 grams of saturated fat, so
￿e = 0:1. E⁄ectively, the excise tax increases the marginal costs of all products by an amount
proportional to their saturated fat content. In the absence of any response by ￿rms (i.e.
assuming 100% pass-through), this causes product prices to increase by the same proportion.
The wedge between consumer and producer prices is independent of the level of prices.
In contrast, an ad valorem tax introduces a wedge between consumer and producer prices
that is proportional to price levels. As with the excise tax, we consider an ad valorem tax that
is proportional to saturated fat content. In this case, with an ad valorem tax rate of ￿av; the
consumer price of product (j;s) is
p
￿
jsm = (1 + ￿avsatjs)pjsm (8)
where pjsm is the producer price and p￿
jsm is the consumer price in market m. To make the initial
levels of the excise and ad valorem taxes comparable, we choose ￿av so that the (expenditure
weighted) average price increase in the absence of any ￿rm response (i.e. 100% pass-through)
is the same in both cases. That is, both taxes produce the same revenue in the absence of
consumer and ￿rm response. This gives us an ad valorem tax rate of ￿av = 0:09. In the absence
of any response by ￿rms, the percentage price increase produced by the tax is proportional to
the volume of saturated fat.
4.2 New market equilibria
We compute the new Nash pricing equilibria, as described in Section 2.4, holding the portfolio
of products ￿xed. The response we estimate is a short-run rather than long-run e⁄ect. While
it is clear that long-run considerations, such as the entry and exit of products, are potentially
important (Anderson et al, 2001, Hamilton, 2009, Draganska et al, 2009), we observe little vari-
ation in portfolios across markets. Nor do we have information about ￿xed costs of marketing
of products. Therefore, our data do not allow for an investigation of long-run e⁄ects.
The excise tax results in higher equilibrium prices than the ad valorem tax. The ad valorem
tax makes increasing producer prices more costly (in terms of lost demand) than an excise tax
does because ￿rms must increase consumer prices by more under the ad valorem tax to achieve
a given increase in producer prices. This in turn results in lower equilibrium prices.
13Under the excise tax, allowing ￿rms to respond results in an average price increase of 19p,
compared to 13p with no response. Pass-through is 145% on average and is almost always
above 100%. It ranges from 92% for Flora Light Spread 1Kg to 240% for Flora Diet 500g.12
Price increases tend to be higher for products with higher saturated fat content.
Under the ad valorem tax, allowing ￿rms to respond results in an average price increase of
6p, compared to 8p with no response. Pass-through is 81% on average and is almost always
below 100%. It ranges from 2% for Flora Proactive Light Spread 250g to 112% for Flora Diet.
As under the excise tax, the prices of high saturated fat products tend to increase by the most.
The ￿rst two columns of Table 7 show pass-through at the ￿rm level (averaged across
products, weighted by market share) under each tax. There is considerable variation in pass-
through across ￿rms in equilibrium. For both the excise and the ad valorem tax Unilever, the
largest ￿rm in the market, has the highest pass-through.
Under both taxes the prices of relatively high fat products increase on average by more than
lower fat products, so households substitute away from relatively high fat products towards
lower fat alternatives, and towards the outside option. Because the excise tax results in higher
equilibrium prices than the ad valorem tax, the excise tax generates more substitution, both
towards the outside option and among the butter and margarine products. While the broad
pattern of substitution towards relatively low fat products is similar for both taxes, the size of
substitution is much less for the ad valorem tax. The market share of the outside increase from
73.6% to 79.1% under the excise tax and to 76.2% under the ad valorem.
Both taxes result in a fall in aggregate pro￿ts, but the fall is considerably larger under the
ad valorem tax (a 14.7% reduction versus a 9.6% reduction). Under the excise tax the market
power that ￿rms have enables them to reoptimise prices, and this in turn lessens the reduction
in pro￿ts. Under an ad valorem tax, ￿rms￿ability to reoptimise prices is less bene￿cial in terms
of allowing them to lessen the pro￿t reduction associated with the introduction of the tax.
The last two columns of Table 7 show the percentage reduction in each ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts. Under
the excise tax the three market leaders - Unilever, Dairy Crest and Arla - all su⁄er smaller
proportional pro￿t reductions than the supermarkets. In contrast, under the ad valorem tax
the three market leading ￿rms do not seem to fare any better in terms of the proportional fall
in pro￿ts, than the other ￿rms in the market do.
Table 8 summarises the aggregate (annual national) impact of introducing the two taxes.
The ￿rst column shows total expenditure, total variable cost (marginal cost times quantity), and
total (variable) pro￿t in the pre-tax equilibrium. The remaining columns show how these ￿gures
change in response to the taxes. They also show how consumer welfare changes, reporting an
12The statistics in this and the next paragraph are computed after excluding three products whose marginal
cost estimates are unstable. Each of these products have market shares below 0.5%.
14estimate of compensating variation for each change.13
A comparison of columns 3 and 5 shows the di⁄erence in aggregate predictions for the two
forms of tax when we compute ￿rms￿pricing responses. Under the excise tax, tax revenue
is about £3.3 million lower in Nash equilibrium than it is in the equilibrium with the ad
valorem tax. In addition, the cost to consumers￿in terms of compensating variation is £26.8
million higher. Under the excise tax, consumers require more compensation to make them
indi⁄erent to the tax￿ s imposition (abstracting from any expected health gains arising from
lower fat consumption). And, since there is more substitution away from butter and margarine
or towards lower fat (and lower taxed) products, less revenue is raised. However, a corollary of
these higher costs and lower tax revenues, is that the excise tax succeeds in inducing a 24.5%
reduction in the amount of saturated fat purchased as butter and margarine. In contrast, the
ad valorem tax achieves a lower reduction of 13.7% (discussed in Section 4.4 and shown in Table
12).
Comparing the results with and without ￿rm response for the excise tax (columns 2 and
3) in Table 8 shows the importance of modelling ￿rms￿pricing response. Since ￿rms optimally
increase their producer prices when faced with the tax, in the case of the excise tax, ignoring
￿rm response leads to an overestimate of tax revenues and the reduction in pro￿ts caused by the
policy and an underestimate of compensating variation. In the case of the ad valorem tax, the
errors are reversed. In this case, assuming 100% pass-through leads to an underestimate of tax
revenues and the reduction in pro￿ts caused by the policy and an overestimate of compensating
variation.
Conclusions about the cost and e¢ cacy of the two forms of tax based on the assumption
of no ￿rm response are therefore likely to be quite wrong. For instance, under the assumption
of 100% pass-through, the two taxes result in similar costs and reductions in saturated fat
purchases (18.8% for the excise tax and 16% for the ad valorem tax). In contrast, the di⁄erence
is much more substantial (24.5% versus 13.7%) when ￿rms can respond by changing prices.
4.3 Impact of multi-product ￿rms
As discussed at the beginning of Section 4, some of the results above depend on the portfolios
of products owned by the ￿rms. Firms can potentially insulate themselves from competition
by the choice of their portfolio. It is interesting to draw out the role that product portfolios
have on the estimated e⁄ects. To do this, we conduct the following counterfactual experiment.
Suppose the products in the market were all produced by single product ￿rms. How would
the tax impacts di⁄er from those under the existing ownership structure? We compute three
13Details of how we compute compensating variation are given in the Web Appendix.
15new equilibria, one with single product ￿rms and no tax, one with single product ￿rms and an
excise tax and one with single product ￿rms and an ad valorem tax.
4.3.1 Comparison of pre-tax equilibria: multi- and single-product ￿rms
A multi-product ￿rm that produces several imperfect substitutes charges higher prices than
several separate ￿rms marketing the same products would have done in equilibrium. Table 9
measures the strength of this e⁄ect. For each ￿rm it shows average price and pro￿ts in the
multi-product ￿rm equilibrium and in the counterfactual single product ￿rm equilibrium. It
also shows the di⁄erence between the multi-product and single product equilibria prices and the
percentage di⁄erence in pro￿ts. So, for instance, in the multi-product ￿rm equilibrium Unilever
charges an average price of £1.12, while the average equilibrium price for Unilever￿ s products
in the single product ￿rm equilibrium is £1.00. The prices of Unilever￿ s products are 12 pence
higher than the prices of the same products in the single product ￿rm equilibrium.
Two points are noticeable. First, the dominant three ￿rms are the only ones that have
a signi￿cant price premium (i.e. a positive di⁄erence between prices in the multi and single
product ￿rm equilibria). These ￿rms produce products clustered in characteristic space. In
the single product ￿rm equilibrium, these products are ￿erce competitors. In contrast, in the
multi-product ￿rm equilibrium, these three ￿rms each bene￿t from dominating a portion of
the characteristics space. If Unilever wants to increase the price of one of its products, it can
be con￿dent that a considerable portion of the lost demand on that product will shift to its
other products. Note also the e⁄ect is stronger for Unilever and Arla than for Dairy Crest
which splits its products between two distinct clusters. The second noteworthy point is that all
￿rms bene￿t from existing in a multi-product ￿rm equilibrium; they all earn higher pro￿ts from
their products than the pro￿ts earned on these products if they were all produced by single
product ￿rms. The three dominant ￿rms are able to increase equilibrium prices, which softens
competition for all ￿rms. This e⁄ect arises in large part from our assumption of Nash-Bertrand
competition.
4.3.2 Impact of a tax in single product ￿rm equilibria
As in the multi-product ￿rm case, pass-through of the excise tax is greater than 100% on most
products. The average pass-through is 130%, which is lower than the multi-product case. Pass-
through of the ad valorem tax is less than 100% for most products, although it is above 100%
for a signi￿cant number of lower fat products. The average pass-through is 89%; slightly higher
than in the multi-product ￿rm equilibrium.
For both taxes substitution occurs between products and to the outside option. With
the excise tax, the amount of substitution is considerably less than in the multi-product ￿rm
16equilibrium (as prices rise by less) and with the ad valorem tax it is slightly higher. With
the excise tax, total pro￿ts fall by 3.44%, which is considerably less than in the multi-product
￿rm case. This is because average pass-through is lower, and pre-tax prices are lower, meaning
demand is less elastic. With the ad valorem tax total pro￿ts fall by 11.26%, also less than in
the multi-product ￿rm case.
4.3.3 Comparison of tax impacts
In the pre-tax equilibrium two ￿rms, Unilever and Arla, who both have portfolios of products
clustered in characteristics space, charged higher equilibrium prices relative to the counterfac-
tual single-product ￿rm equilibrium. Table 10 shows average pass-through by ￿rm under the
two ownership structures and under the two taxes. Under the excise tax, the increase in pass-
through in the multi-product ￿rm equilibrium (relative to the single product ￿rm one) is largest
for these two ￿rms. To the extent that consumers see their products as being closer substitutes
with one another, Unilever (and Arla) are able to increase prices by more in response to the
introduction of the tax than several single-product ￿rms selling the same products would in the
single-product ￿rm equilibrium. For other ￿rms, average pass-through is also higher. In the
ad valorem case, average pass-through is less in the multi-product ￿rm equilibrium with a few
exceptions. These exceptions include Unilever and Arla, as in the excise tax case they bene￿t
from clustering their products together in characteristics space.
To illustrate the factors driving this portfolio e⁄ect, for each ￿rm, we compute the cross-
price elasticities between products owned by the ￿rm and compare them with the cross-price
elasticities between products owned by the ￿rm and products that are owned by its competitors.
Consider Unilever and Tesco. Recall Unilever produces 19 relatively homogeneous margarine
products, while Tesco produces 18 products with quite varied characteristics. Figure 1a shows
results for Unilever. The left panel shows the distribution of cross-price elasticities for Unilever
products with respect to the prices of all other Unilever products. The right panel shows
the distribution of the cross-price elasticities of demand for Unilever products with respect
to the prices of all other products (produced by other ￿rms). Comparing the panels shows
that Unilever products are relatively close substitutes. This explains why Unilever is able to
pass-through more of the tax than several single-product ￿rms selling the same products could.
Figure 1b shows the results for Tesco. The left panel shows the cross-price elasticities for
Tesco products with respect to the prices of all other Tesco products. The right panel shows
elasticities with respect to the prices of all other products (produced by other ￿rms). In contrast
to Unilever, Tesco products are not closer substitutes to one another than products produced
by other ￿rms. Tesco￿ s pro￿ts from butter and margarine are not insulated from competition
in the same way that Unilever￿ s are. Tesco is unable to exploit being a multi-product butter
17and margarine seller to the same extent as Unilever.14
Table 11 displays results for all ￿rms. For brevity we report only the means of the distri-
butions. The table reveals a similar pattern. The within-￿rm average cross-price elasticities
of Arla and Dairy Crest products are both higher than the between-￿rm average cross-price
elasticities. For the supermarkets, the between-￿rm average elasticity is actually higher. Unlike
￿rms who specialise in producing butter and margarine, supermarkets may have other aims,
not just to maximise butter and margarine pro￿ts.
4.4 Policy impact
How e⁄ective are the taxes at achieving the policy goal of reducing saturated fat consumption?
We de￿ne the economic cost of each policy as the sum of the fall in ￿rm pro￿ts plus com-
pensating variation minus tax revenues. This corresponds with the traditional dead weight loss
associated with taxation. This is reported in Table 8. However, one of the purposes of taxing
saturated fat may be to reduce consumption and improve health. It therefore is informative
to calculate the economic cost associated with achieving a given reduction in saturated fat
purchases. This can then be compared with the expected bene￿ts of a corresponding fall in
consumption.
Using the reduction in households￿saturated fat purchases and our de￿nition of the economic
cost of the policy, we compute the average cost of achieving a 1kg reduction in households￿
annual saturated fat purchases from butter and margarine. This is shown in Table 12. The
cost per kg under the excise tax is £3.52 and the cost under the ad valorem tax is £3.74 (when
we model ￿rms￿pricing responses). This suggests an excise tax may be more cost e⁄ective at
reducing saturated fat purchases.
We also show the portion of the cost of achieving a 1kg reduction in each households￿
annual saturated fat purchases that is borne by consumers. We do this using the compensating
variation associated with the policies. We report the average consumer cost in the last row of
Table 12 - it is £5.01 per kg for the excise tax and £5.34 for the ad valorem tax (when we model
￿rms￿pricing responses).
4.4.1 Variation across households
The aggregate ￿gures in Table 12 summarise the e⁄ects of introducing the taxes. However,
they mask considerable heterogeneity in responses across households. Figure 2 illustrates this
heterogeneity by plotting the cumulative density functions of the consumer cost of achieving
a 1kg reduction in annual saturated fat purchases across all households. The solid line is the
14Although, of course, Tesco sells many other products and this analysis abstracts from interactions between
its butter and margarine pricing decisions and decisions for all other products.
18density for the excise tax and the broken line is the density for the ad valorem tax. In each
case the costs range from around £4 to £8. At each quantile of the distributions the consumer
cost under the ad valorem tax is greater. The variation does not seem to be correlated with
observable household characteristics.
Finally, since we observe the entire shopping basket of each household for an entire year,
we can calculate the total annual amount of saturated fat purchased by each household and
compute the proportion of household energy purchased in the form of saturated fat. According
to the UK Department of Health,15 people should aim to consume no more than 11% of their
energy in the form of saturated fat. In our sample, the mean proportion of energy purchased as
saturated fat is 15.1% with a standard deviation of 2.7%. We calculate the mean reduction in
saturated fat purchases from a butter and margarine tax over households in each decile of the
distribution. Figure 3 plots the results. It shows that the policy induces the smallest reduction
in saturated fat purchases for those households that purchase the smallest fraction of their
energy as saturated fat. The largest reduction is achieved by households in the sixth decile.
5 Summary and Conclusion
There is considerable policy interest in using tax as an instrument to change food purchasing
behaviour (and raise revenue). The existing literature that considers the impact of such taxes
has assumed complete pass-through, has not accounted for the oligopolistic structure of the food
industry and has ruled out ex ante substitution across products within broad food categories.
We provide estimates of the e⁄ectiveness of di⁄erent forms of tax in altering food consump-
tion behaviour. We use micro data to model consumer substitution across products, frequency
of purchase and quantity and we model ￿rms￿strategic pricing responses. We compute the
impact of these taxes on consumption, the incidence of the tax on consumers and ￿rms, and
the deadweight loss. Our results suggest that modeling ￿rm behaviour is crucial to obtaining
an accurate picture of the impact of a tax. They also show that the portfolio of products that
￿rms own is an important determinant of the impact the tax will have on individual ￿rms
and they suggest that an excise tax is a more e¢ cient way of achieving a given reduction in
saturated fat purchases.
We provide an estimate of the short run impact of the introduction of a tax on saturated fat;
further work and additional data are needed to evaluate the long-run impacts of such policies.
To evaluate long-run impacts, we would need evidence on entry and exit from the market or
on the costs of entry and exit.
15See Report to the Panel on Dietary Reference Values of the Committee on Medical Aspects of Food Poilcy
(1991)
19Our results provide evidence on the demand impacts of the tax, on the distributional e⁄ects
of the tax and on the cost. To justify these type of sin taxes, the impacts calculated in this paper
need to be weighed against expected health gains, distributional goals and any ine¢ ciencies
that might exist due to market imperfections related to health and nutrition.16 If individuals
are fully informed about the impact of saturated fat, and if the social costs of saturated fat
consumption are fully internalised by the individual, then government intervention to curb
saturated fat consumption will not be welfare improving. If individuals are not fully informed
about the fat content of foods or the optimal fat consumption, or for some reason are not fully
rational, there may be some e¢ ciency gain from these taxes.17 Alternatively, since both state
and private insurance markets do not condition insurance premiums on fat consumption, even
if consumption choices are privately optimal, there may be an e¢ ciency gain from these taxes.
16FSA (2009) :"It has been estimated that reducing saturated fat intakes to within recommended levels could
result in approximately 3500 UK deaths averted annually and should improve the quality of life of many more
people, saving the UK economy about £1bn each year"
17See, inter alia, Armstrong (2008) and Gri¢ th and O￿ Connell (2010).
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Price in £  (price)  1.02  0.48 
Saturated fat volume in g  (saturates)  112.90  55.92 
Sodium volume in g  (sodium)  2.91  1.87 
Pack size 250g   (250g)  0.32  0.47 
Pack size 500g   (500g)  0.50  0.50 
Pack size 1Kg   (1Kg)  0.17  0.38 
Pack size 2Kg   (2Kg)  0.002  0.04 
Budget brand  (budget)  0.12  0.33 
Butter  (butter)  0.38  0.49 
Healthy margarine  (healthy)  0.15  0.35 
PUFA margarine  (pufa)  0.19  0.39 
Standard margarine  (standard)  0.28  0.45 
      
Household characteristics      
Income < £10,000pa  (0k‐10k income)  0.13  0.33 
£10,000pa < Income < £20,000pa  (10k‐20k income)  0.28  0.45 
£20,000pa < Income < £30,000pa  (20k‐30k income)  0.23  0.42 
£30,000pa < Income < £40,000pa  (30k‐40k income)  0.15  0.36 
Income > £40,000pa  (40k+ income)  0.20  0.40 
Household in social classes A, B or C1  (upper)  0.48  0.50 
Household size  (hh size)  2.64  1.31 
Couple with children  (couple with kids)  0.31  0.46 
Single parent household  (single kids)  0.04  0.20 
Household with children  (no kids)  0.46  0.50 
Pensioner household  (pensioner)  0.18  0.39 
Main shopper not overweight  (bmi 25‐)  0.23  0.42 
Main shopper overweight  (bmi 25+)  0.30  0.46 
Main shopper bmi not reported  (bmi missing)  0.47  0.50 
Household is in South East of UK  (seast)  0.42  0.49 
Household is in South West of UK  (swest)  0.24  0.43 
























Unilever Bestfoods  19 28.83% Flora Light Low Fat Spread 500g
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  17 20.48% Clover Dairy Spread 500g 
Arla Foods  16 17.65% Lurpak Lighter Slightly Salted Spreadable 500g
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  18 11.61% Tesco Value Blended 250g 
Asda Stores Ltd  14 5.73% Asda Smart Price Blended 250g
J Sainsburys  16 4.21% Sainsbury Basic English 250g
Morrisons Ltd  13 3.14% Morrisons English 250g 
Lidl UK GMBH  6 1.65% Lidl Slightly Salted German 250g
The Kerrygold Co. Ltd  3 1.43% Kerrygold Standard Irish 250g
Matthews Foods Plc  4 1.40% Pure Soya Spread 500g 
Aldi Stores Ltd  5 1.38% Aldi Blended 250g
Evan Rees Ltd  1 0.96% Hollybush English 250g 
Lactalis Beurres Et Frmgs  1 0.47% President French Unsalted 250g 
Netto Ltd  3 0.38% Netto Veg Spread 500g 
Yeo Valley Farms Ltd  1 0.22% Yeo Valley Blended Organic 250g 
C.W.S. (Co‐op)  2 0.18% Co‐Op Creamery Blended 250g 
Waitrose Ltd  1 0.16% Waitrose English 250g 
Somerfield Stores Ltd  2 0.13% Somerfield Unsalted English 250g
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Table 3: Matrix of selected aggregate own and cross price elasticities 
































































‐2.6838  0.0188  0.0180  0.0538  0.0589  0.0168  0.0014  0.0001  0.0009  0.0006  0.0013 
500g
0.0079  ‐2.6263  0.0175  0.0308  0.0331  0.0162  0.0009  0.0001  0.0006  0.0003  0.0009 
Spreadable  250g
0.0082  0.0189  ‐2.6828  0.0549  0.0610  0.0172  0.0013  0.0001  0.0009  0.0006  0.0013 
Spreadable  500g
0.0075  0.0101  0.0168  ‐2.4443  0.0182  0.0157  0.0008  0.0001  0.0006  0.0002  0.0008 
Lighter Spreadable 
500g
0.0074  0.0099  0.0167  0.0171  ‐2.4404  0.0158  0.0009  0.0001  0.0006  0.0002  0.0009 
Lighter Spreadable 
250g


















0.0058  0.0091  0.0125  0.0261  0.0295  0.0119  ‐2.0816  0.0002  0.0014  0.0011  0.0018 
Soft 500g
0.0054  0.0074  0.0114  0.0210  0.0239  0.0108  0.0019  ‐1.8778  0.0016  0.0012  0.0019 
Best for Baking 500g
0.0055  0.0085  0.0120  0.0245  0.0281  0.0114  0.0019  0.0002  ‐2.0791  0.0012  0.0019 
Reduced Fat 500g
0.0046  0.0048  0.0095  0.0135  0.0152  0.0089  0.0019  0.0002  0.0015  ‐1.2395  0.0019 
Low Fat Sunflower 
Spread 500g














        
Unilever Bestfoods  Flora Light Low Fat Spread 500g  3.83% 0.95  0.53  0.03  0.44 
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  Clover Dairy Spread 500g  3.45% 1.09  0.67  0.09  0.39 
Unilever Bestfoods  I.C.B.I.N.B Dairy Spread 500g  3.45% 0.76  0.41  0.07  0.46 
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  St Ivel Utterly Butterly Dairy 















Supermarkets’ 250g Budget Butters          
Aldi Stores Ltd  Aldi Blended 250g  0.37%  0.53  0.29  0.00  0.46 
Asda Stores Ltd  Asda Spread Blended 250g  2.08%  0.53  0.28  0.00  0.47 
Morrisons  Morrisons Bettabuy English 
250g  0.60%  0.53  0.28  0.00  0.47 
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  Tesco Value Blended 250g  3.91%  0.53  0.28  0.00  0.48 
500g Buttery Margarine Products          
Asda Stores Ltd 
Asda You'd Better Believe It's 
Butter Dairy Spread 500g  0.53%  0.76  0.46  0.04  0.40 
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  St Ivel Utterly Butterly Dairy 
Spread 500g  3.29%  0.76  0.45  0.06  0.41 
J Sainsburys  Sainsbury's Butterlicious 500g  0.39%  0.77  0.47  0.04  0.40 
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  Tesco Butter Me Up Spread 
500g  1.13%  0.75  0.44  0.05  0.41 
Unilever Bestfoods  I.C.B.I.N.B Dairy Spread 500g  3.45%  0.76  0.41  0.07  0.46 
250g Tesco Butters Of Varying Degree Of Quality          
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  Tesco Value Blended 250g  3.91%  0.53  0.28  0.00  0.48 
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  Tesco Creamery Blended 250g  3.83%  0.58  0.32  0.00  0.46 
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  Tesco Organic Danish 250g  3.45%  0.88  0.53  0.02  0.40 



















Unilever Bestfoods  19 28.54% 0.56  1.12 0.49 76.55 
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  17 20.38% 0.58  1.01 0.42 41.42 
Arla Foods  16 18.13% 0.78  1.39 0.43 52.77 
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  18 11.49% 0.45  0.76 0.43 17.59 
Asda Stores Ltd  14 5.64% 0.39  0.68 0.46 7.78 
J Sainsburys  16 4.19% 0.43  0.73 0.44 6.09 
Morrisons Ltd  13 3.15% 0.38  0.66 0.45 4.26 
Lidl UK GMBH  6 1.68% 0.33  0.60 0.45 2.12 
The Kerrygold Co. Ltd  3 1.46% 0.60  1.00 0.40 2.80 
Matthews Foods Plc  4 1.42% 0.55  0.89 0.38 2.33 
Aldi Stores Ltd  5 1.39% 0.44  0.75 0.43 2.03 
Evan Rees Ltd  1 0.97% 0.29  0.53 0.46 1.15 
Lactalis Beurres Et Frmgs  1 0.48% 0.60  0.96 0.38 0.84 
Netto Ltd  3 0.37% 0.15  0.37 0.67 0.40 
Yeo Valley Farms Ltd  1 0.23% 0.71  1.13 0.37 0.46 
C.W.S. (Co‐op)  2 0.18% 0.50  0.81 0.39 0.26 
Waitrose Ltd  1 0.16% 0.45  0.75 0.40 0.23 
Somerfield Stores Ltd  2 0.14% 0.58  0.94 0.38 0.23 










  Excise tax  Ad valorem Excise tax  Ad valorem 
Unilever Bestfoods  165%  98% ‐ 5.00% ‐ 10.60% 
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  137%  60% ‐ 10.30% ‐ 16.70% 
Arla Foods  154%  89% ‐ 9.20% ‐ 19.70% 
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  138%  76% ‐ 17.60% ‐ 15.20% 
Asda Stores Ltd  133%  73% ‐ 16.80% ‐ 12.30% 
J Sainsburys  136%  78% ‐ 15.70% ‐ 13.10% 
Morrisons Ltd  136%  76% ‐ 19.30% ‐ 13.70% 
Lidl UK GMBH  137%  80% ‐ 13.60% ‐ 7.70% 
The Kerrygold Co. Ltd  149%  97% ‐ 15.70% ‐ 21.30% 
Matthews Foods Plc  148%  96% ‐ 7.50% ‐ 10.60% 
Aldi Stores Ltd  136%  78% ‐ 16.10% ‐ 15.50% 
Evan Rees Ltd  135%  74% ‐ 28.60% ‐ 15.00% 
Lactalis Beurres Et Frmgs  149%  95% ‐ 10.60% ‐ 13.90% 
Netto Ltd  122%  35% ‐ 22.90% ‐ 6.50% 
Yeo Valley Farms Ltd  141%  92% ‐ 6.90% ‐ 14.00% 
C.W.S. (Co‐op)  142%  92% ‐ 9.10% ‐ 9.50% 
Waitrose Ltd  144%  91% ‐ 16.50% ‐ 13.90% 















  1  2  3  4  5 
Expenditure  490.70  469.90  461.99  468.47  470.73 
   ‐ 4.24% ‐ 5.85% ‐ 4.53% ‐ 4.07% 
Estimated variable cost  271.38  235.19  222.83  234.81  239.51 
   ‐ 13.33% ‐ 17.89% ‐ 13.48% ‐ 11.74% 
Firm variable profits  219.32  190.76  198.34  189.73  187.12 
   ‐ 13.02% ‐ 9.56% ‐ 13.49% ‐ 14.68% 
Tax revenue   43.94  40.81  43.93  44.11 






































Unilever Bestfoods  19  1.12 1.00 0.117  76.55 68.41 11.91% 
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  17  1.01 0.96 0.043  41.42 37.48 10.50% 
Arla Foods  16  1.39 1.28 0.107  52.77 45.60 15.72% 
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  18  0.76 0.75 0.018  17.59 16.17 8.82% 
Asda Stores Ltd  14  0.68 0.67 0.008  7.78 7.21 7.85% 
J Sainsburys  16  0.73 0.72 0.010  6.09 5.60 8.84% 
Morrisons Ltd  13  0.66 0.65 0.006  4.26 3.94 8.24% 
Lidl UK GMBH  6  0.60 0.59 0.002  2.12 1.98 6.90% 
The Kerrygold Co. Ltd  3  1.00 0.99 0.011  2.80 2.48 12.94% 
Matthews Foods Plc  4  0.89 0.89 0.005  2.33 2.10 10.60% 
Aldi Stores Ltd  5  0.75 0.74 0.010  2.03 1.86 9.05% 
Evan Rees Ltd  1  0.53 0.54 ‐0.003  1.15 1.08 6.70% 
Lactalis Beurres Et Frmgs  1  0.96 0.96 ‐0.004  0.84 0.75 11.31% 
Netto Ltd  3  0.37 0.37 0.004  0.40 0.38 5.43% 
Yeo Valley Farms Ltd  1  1.13 1.13 ‐0.001  0.46 0.41 13.71% 
C.W.S. (Co‐op)  2  0.81 0.81 0.002  0.26 0.24 9.20% 
Waitrose Ltd  1  0.75 0.75 ‐0.002  0.23 0.21 8.88% 























Unilever Bestfoods  165%  132%  32%  98%  89%  9% 
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  137%  128%  9%  60%  69%  ‐9% 
Arla Foods  154%  132%  21%  89%  67%  22% 
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  138%  129%  9%  76%  93%  ‐16% 
Asda Stores Ltd  133%  127%  6%  73%  88%  ‐14% 
J Sainsburys  136%  128%  8%  78%  93%  ‐15% 
Morrisons Ltd  136%  128%  7%  76%  90%  ‐14% 
Lidl UK GMBH  137%  130%  7%  80%  88%  ‐8% 
The Kerrygold Co. Ltd  149%  137%  12%  97%  62%  35% 
Matthews Foods Plc  148%  140%  8%  96%  100%  ‐4% 
Aldi Stores Ltd  136%  127%  8%  78%  86%  ‐8% 
Evan Rees Ltd  135%  129%  7%  74%  75%  0% 
Lactalis Beurres Et Frmgs  149%  141%  8%  95%  102%  ‐7% 
Netto Ltd  122%  117%  6%  35%  64%  ‐29% 
Yeo Valley Farms Ltd  141%  137%  3%  92%  98%  ‐7% 
C.W.S. (Co‐op)  142%  137%  5%  92%  100%  ‐7% 
Waitrose Ltd  144%  136%  8%  91%  95%  ‐4% 






















Unilever Bestfoods  19  28.54%  ‐2.405  0.0160  0.0058 
Dairy Crest Foods Ltd  17  20.38%  ‐2.465  0.0126  0.0069 
Arla Foods  16  18.13%  ‐2.570  0.0175  0.0061 
   11.49%      
Supermarkets with 
own‐brand products 
  5.64%      
Tesco Food Stores Ltd  18  4.19%  ‐2.431  0.0054  0.0081 
Asda Stores Ltd  14  3.15%  ‐2.314  0.0029  0.0080 
J Sainsburys  16  1.68%  ‐2.392  0.0021  0.0083 
Morrisons Ltd  13  1.46%  ‐2.309  0.0016  0.0079 
Lidl UK GMBH  6  1.42%  ‐2.274  0.0020  0.0073 
Aldi Stores Ltd  5  1.39%  ‐2.385  0.0023  0.0078 
   0.97%      
Small manufacturers   0.48%      
The Kerrygold Co. Ltd  3  0.37%  ‐2.536  0.0050  0.0077 
Matthews Foods Plc  4  0.23%  ‐2.636  0.0030  0.0086 
Evan Rees Ltd  1  0.18%  ‐2.171 ‐   0.0067 
Lactalis Beurres Et Frmg  1  0.16%  ‐2.660 ‐   0.0088 
Netto Ltd  3  0.14%  ‐1.584  0.0006  0.0059 
C.W.S. (Co‐op)  2  28.54%  ‐2.589  0.0009  0.0084 
Waitrose Ltd  1  20.38%  ‐2.520 ‐   0.0079 
Yeo Valley Farms Ltd  1  18.13%  ‐2.724 ‐   0.0092 





















54.09  43.94  40.81  45.41  46.65 
   ‐18.75% ‐ 24.54% ‐ 16.04% ‐ 13.74% 
Mean cost of a 1kg reduction 
in saturated fat (£) 
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The estimated coe¢ cients allow us to calculate own and cross-price elasticities
for each product and each household. We compute market elasticities for each
product by aggregating across households and weighting by the frequency that
each household shops and the household sampling weights (which gross up to
the UK population).1 We assume that the preference shocks determinining
purchase decisions are i.i.d. across trips, and that the number of shopping trips
per year is ￿xed (i.e. is not in￿ uenced by the price of butter).
A household is de￿ned by its vector of characteristics zi: Denote the uncon-
ditional probability that a household with characteristics zi chooses option (j;s)




where ￿1 is the vector of non-stochastic coe¢ cients, ￿2 is the vector of random





is the probability that zi chooses (j;s) conditional on ￿2.















1The household sampling weights correct for over sampling of some demographics by the
market research ￿rm. Sampling weights are not used in estimation because sample selection
is based on exogenous demographics, not on the endogenous choice of butter purchases.
1Let wm (zi) be proportional to the inverse of the probability that a household
with characteristics zi, observed in market m is included in the sample, let
X
i2nm
wm (zi) = 1 and suppose nm households are observed in market m. Then




























Let Ti be the proportion of total shopping trips by all households in the
market taken by household i: Assuming that the probability of purchase is





























A similar procedure yields the market level cross price elasticities.
2 Estimated coe¢ cients
Table A.1 reports the non-brand ￿xed e⁄ect estamated coe¢ cients. The ￿rst
column reports the mean impact of the product characteristics that vary within
2brand. The coe¢ cients on price, the nutrient variables and the pack size dum-
mies are identi￿ed from the within brand variation in these characteristics (and
across market variation in the case of price). The second column reports the
estimated variance of the random coe¢ cients. We allow for random preference
variation for price and saturated fat content. The remaining columns report the
coe¢ cients on the product-household characteristic interactions. The negative,
and large in absolute terms, coe¢ cient on price means that most households
reduce their demand in response to an increase in price. The interactions be-
tween price and observable household characteristics allow the mean coe¢ cient
on price to vary with observables and the random coe¢ cient on price allows for
random variation in households￿responsiveness to price. The coe¢ cients on the
interactive terms broadly accord with intuition; for instance, large households
prefer larger pack sizes and higher income households have a distaste for own-
brand budget products. The ￿j that we include in our model are brand level
￿xed e⁄ects, and Table A.2 reports the estimated brand ￿xed e⁄ects.
2.1 Compensating variation
We consider the impact on consumers of the tax by calculating the compensating


























ij and V NEW
ij are pre and post tax utility respectively. The ￿rst
term in the numerator of (7) is the expected utility under the new prices and
3the second is expected utility under the old prices. The denominator is equal
to the marginal utility of income under some assumptions outlined in Small
and Rosen (1981). The formula takes account of utility from the inside options
(j > 0)and the outside option (j = 0). It varies across households because: (i)
some households have a high utility from the outside option and therefore are
very likely to buy the outside option and hence have small impacts, (ii) some
households have high utility for an option that does not have close substitutes
and so do not switch (inelastic demand), (iii) some households are readily willing
to switch to a lower fat product, and (iv) household￿ s price sensitivity in the
denominator varies.
4References
Small, K and Rosen, H (1981) "Applied welfare economics of discrete choice
models" Econometrica 49, 1, 105-130
5  6
Table A.1: Estimated coefficients 















budget       0.0172 ‐0.1075 ‐0.4971 ‐0.4543 ‐0.6757   
       (0.0589) (0.2173) (0.2401) (0.2617) (0.2571)   
butter    0.1127  0.0528 0.1180 ‐0.0543 0.0957 0.2158 0.1473 0.0648 ‐0.0799 ‐0.0718 ‐0.6475 ‐0.2976  0.0780 
    (0.2897)  (0.2546) (0.1125) (0.3087) (0.3329) (0.3657) (0.3709) (0.1540) (0.2978) (0.2440) (0.6689) (0.1651)  (0.1606) 
health    0.2025 ‐ 0.1656 0.0204 0.1996 0.2025 0.0754 0.2722 0.1529 ‐0.4587 ‐0.0360 ‐0.5628 ‐0.0461 ‐ 0.1669 
    (0.3447)  (0.3058) (0.1066) (0.2871) (0.3132) (0.3468) (0.3496) (0.1574) (0.3084) (0.2490) (0.6665) (0.1700)  (0.1586) 
price  ‐5.2624  5.6399 0.2617  0.3923 ‐0.0945 0.0446 ‐0.0001 0.2111 0.4118 ‐0.0207 0.0175 ‐0.0621 0.0915 0.1350 ‐ 0.0556 
  (0.5916)  (1.3227) (0.1752)  (0.1606) (0.0904) (0.2317) (0.2498) (0.2706) (0.2682) (0.1159) (0.2014) (0.1826) (0.6957) (0.1261)  (0.1128) 
pufa   ‐ 0.0448 ‐ 0.1424 ‐0.0799 0.0386 0.1041 0.0540 0.2471 0.1827 ‐0.1826 ‐0.0369 ‐0.7517 0.1440 ‐ 0.0443 
    (0.2615)  (0.2259) (0.0826) (0.2245) (0.2485) (0.2791) (0.2842) (0.1256) (0.2310) (0.1868) (0.5652) (0.1316)  (0.1275) 
250g       ‐0.1805     
       (0.0641)     
500g  2.7263         





  (0.5580)          
2kg  10.2859         
  (0.9336)          
saturates  ‐0.0085  0.0000 ‐0.0002 ‐ 0.0020 0.0006 0.0021 0.0012 0.0002 0.0017 0.0002 ‐0.0036 0.0019 0.0010 0.0013 ‐ 0.0010 
  (0.0030)  (0.0000) (0.0019)  (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0050) (0.0015)  (0.0014) 
sodium  ‐0.0849  0.0284  0.0277 ‐0.0061 ‐0.1018 ‐0.1205 ‐0.1126 ‐0.1935 ‐0.0709 0.1547 ‐0.1463 ‐0.0270 ‐0.0959  ‐0.0398 
  (0.1139)  (0.0604)  (0.0548) (0.0317) (0.0804) (0.0869) (0.0953) (0.0960) (0.0415) (0.0662) (0.0621) (0.1632) (0.0446)  (0.0429) 
outside    0.3425  0.0976 ‐0.3683 0.0672 ‐0.1224 ‐0.1695 0.0526 0.0602 0.3215 ‐0.5062 0.1536 ‐0.2101 ‐ 0.0918 















































































































































































Tesco Butter Me Up  2 ‐3.278   10
  (0.251)
Tesco Creamery  1 ‐1.181 
  (0.296)
Tesco Finest Other  1 ‐3.189 
  (1.023)
Tesco Healthy Light Olive Spread  1 ‐4.576 
  (0.821)
Tesco Healthy Living Low Fat Spread  2 ‐5.131 
  (0.342)
Tesco Olive Gold Reduced Fat Spread   3 ‐3.432 
  (0.236)
Tesco Organic Danish Butter  1 ‐1.689 
  (0.618)
Tesco Soft Margarine  1 ‐9.027 
  (0.899)
Tesco Spreadable Butter  1 ‐2.834 
  (0.856)
Tesco Sunflower Pufa  1 ‐4.546 
  (0.318)
Tesco Value Blended Butter  1 ‐0.007 
  (0.311)
Tesco Value Soft Spread  1 ‐7.179 
  (0.638)
Tesco Low Cholesterol Sunflower Spread  1 ‐4.951 
  (0.588)
Vitalite Pufa  1 ‐2.774 
  (0.255)
Waitrose Butter  1 ‐2.646 
  (0.879)
What Not Butter Spread  1 ‐4.670 
  (0.805)
Willow Dairy Spread  2 ‐3.201 
  (0.254)
Yeo Valley Organic Butter  1 ‐1.196 
  (0.716)
Yorkshire Butter  1 ‐2.754 
   (0.933) 
Notes: 16,637 households. Standard errors in parenthesis; coefficients in bold are significant at 5% level. 